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An Honest Broker? 
The American Consul 




U.S. humanitarian activity in Jerusalem, 
and Palestine as a whole, from the early 
nineteenth century onward challenges 
the traditional view that the United 
States played a relatively marginal role 
in the region until the end of World War 
II. This article argues that American aid, 
initially understood as a religious duty 
of individuals, was transformed into an 
organized form of aid that served as a 
form of soft power in the region. The 
agency of U.S. consul Otis Glazebrook 
is under scrutiny in this article and its 
analysis shows the fundamental role 
he played in this shift. Individual aid 
was superseded by institutional help 
and the shift was embodied in the aid 
and relief sent to the Jews. Eventually 
U.S. institutional aid during the war 
paved the way for formal support for 
Zionism and the notion that only Jews 
(and especially American Jews, who 
thought of themselves as agents of 
innovation) could lead Palestine into 
modernity. While Glazebrook was 
arguably not a supporter of political 
Zionism, his agency led America and 
Zionism to meet each other and initiate 
a lasting relationship.
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until the end of World War II. Prior to World War I, however, the link between the 
United States and Palestine was one that mainly depended upon individuals rather 
than institutions.1 Americans viewed Palestine and Jerusalem through a biblical 
lens, and American Christian settlers grew in numbers, coming to Jerusalem in 
response to messianic expectations.2 However, U.S. missionaries in Jerusalem 
never gained the prominence they did in Lebanon and other parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. This shaped the official U.S. government role in Palestine: U.S. consuls, 
though they served individuals and even communities that had moved to Jerusalem 
for religious reasons, were not much concerned with missionaries per se.3 The U.S. 
consulate in Jerusalem was thus less active than other states’ diplomatic institutions 
in Palestine.4 Given the relative unimportance of the position from a diplomatic 
perspective, U.S. consuls were for the most part entrepreneurs or scholars who saw 
their appointment as a way to advance their personal business.5 
Consular activity did, however, still shape relations in Palestine. U.S. consuls 
were responsible for maintaining the records of U.S. citizens and protecting nationals 
residing within the consular jurisdiction of Jerusalem, including American protégés. 
The consul also registered the births, marriages, and deaths of U.S. citizens, issued 
passports, and provided a large range of services, such as supplying U.S. companies 
with business reports. Consuls also performed legal functions such as handling 
claims filed in the United States against U.S. citizens residing in Jerusalem.6 Since 
many of the U.S. consuls were ordained Protestant clergymen, missionaries and 
Christian settlers were, unsurprisingly, the most important recipients of consular 
help, although pilgrims and tourists visiting the Holy Land frequently became 
beneficiaries as well.7
Relations between Jewish communities in Palestine and U.S. officials were strained 
during the Ottoman period, in part because the United States was associated with 
missionary activity that included, as part of its objectives, the conversion of Jews to 
Christianity. The general failure of this project, however, eased relations between U.S. 
consuls and Jewish communities. (Indeed, the first U.S. consul to Jerusalem, Warder 
Cresson, appointed in May 1844, went the other direction, converting to Judaism and 
establishing a Jewish agricultural colony near Jerusalem.)8 Several Jewish communities 
in Palestine claimed U.S. protection, particularly in Jerusalem, Safad, and Tiberias, 
and under capitulary rights U.S. consuls often granted citizenship or protection to 
non-American Jews.9 American Jews attempted to establish a community, or kolel, 
for Jews from the American diaspora in Jerusalem in 1879. However, it was not until 
1896 that the Kolel America Tife’ret Yerushalayim (the American Congregation Pride 
of Jerusalem) was officially established, leading to a reorganization of the substantial 
halukka funds received from the United States.10 
The humanitarian crisis created by World War I altered this state of affairs. U.S. 
institutional aid during the war paved the way for formal support for Zionism and 
the notion that only Jews (and especially American Jews, who thought of themselves 
as agents of innovation) could lead Palestine into modernity.11 After the war, U.S. 
involvement in the region became more institutionalized and more organized, 
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ultimately taking the form of a strong American paternalism without the cruelty 
of a colonial occupation.12 The U.S. consul in Jerusalem during World War I, Otis 
Glazebrook, played – perhaps unwittingly, but effectively – a central role in these 
fundamental shifts. Glazebrook, a retired pastor, became U.S. consul in 1914. He 
had hoped to spend his remaining years quietly in the Holy Land, but the outbreak of 
World War I unexpectedly thrust him into a crucial, active role in managing the crises 
that beset that region. 
Glazebrook’s activity, as U.S. consul and as an American Christian, illuminate a bond 
forged between the United States and the Holy Land through its Jewish communities.13 
Glazebrook’s appointment represented a shift toward the formalization of what had 
previously been merely personal bonds between individuals in the United States and 
the Holy Land. At the outbreak of the war, this relationship could have developed 
in a number of directions, but the war and the work of the Zionist Organization in 
Britain and the United States not only resulted in the Balfour Declaration, but also 
drove the relationship between the United States and the Holy Land toward an 
American-Jewish entente that would solidify over the following decades.14 Although 
several historians of late Ottoman and early British Palestine have discussed the U.S. 
consul’s involvement in the distribution of aid to local Jewish communities, his role 
as an intercommunal and intracommunal broker has been generally overlooked.15 The 
most detailed examination of Glazebrook’s role, written by Frank Manuel in 1949, 
paints Glazebrook as a colorless diplomat, naïve and somewhat anti-Zionist. Though 
Manuel does mention Glazebrook’s enormous labor on behalf of Palestine’s Jewish 
community, he suggests that the consul was not acting on his own initiative, but was 
compelled by the U.S. government.16 Evidence form the archives of the Alpha Tau 
Omega fraternity and the U.S. National Archives, however, illuminate Glazebrook’s 
role in shifting the U.S. role toward an institutionalized support of Palestine’s Jewish 
community couched in humanitarian terms, and thus offering a new chronology of 
the United States’ support for Zionism that recognizes World War I, rather than World 
War II, as the foundational moment in this support.17
The United States, the Ottoman Empire, and Palestine
Relations between the United States and the Middle East date back to the early years of 
the republic. Before World War I, however, Ottoman Palestine held no great importance 
for most Americans.18 Many knew of Palestine as the biblical Holy Land. For a 
smaller group, it was a supplier of and potential market for commercial goods. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. president William Howard Taft inaugurated an 
aggressive trade policy known as “dollar diplomacy,” which made the Ottoman Empire 
a more palatable market. By the outbreak of World War I, exports to the United States 
accounted for 23 percent of total Ottoman exports – it is, however, hard to determine 
exports from Palestine, specifically – though the Ottoman Empire accounted for less 
than 1 percent of annual U.S. exports.19 Compared with German, British, French, 
Russian, and Italian investments, however, U.S. trade remained negligible.20
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Some Americans have had some personal interactions with inhabitants of Ottoman 
Palestine. At the turn of the nineteenth century, many Palestinians migrated to the 
United States for short periods – seeking money and avoiding military service – while 
Jewish communities in Palestine had begun to receive charitable support from Jewish-
American institutions and were experiencing the first benefits of small but significant 
American investments in Palestine. But most Americans would have found it nearly 
impossible to find Palestine on a map.21 
The activities of American missionaries in the Middle East may have been the most 
significant element in bilateral Ottoman–U.S. relations.22 Having failed to convert 
the region’s inhabitants, American missionaries turned to improving the temporal 
conditions of the population through education and medical care. They opened 
educational and charitable institutions as an alternative way to establish their presence 
and influence. These became a source of competition with Ottoman institutions and 
other educational enterprises and played a significant role in the development of the 
nahda (the Arab cultural awakening), thus serving as a source of tension between the 
United States and the Ottoman Empire.23
Perhaps even more importantly, these missionaries shaped U.S. perceptions of 
the Ottoman Empire. Edward Earle, a professor at Columbia University, asserted 
in 1929 that “for almost a century, American public opinion concerning the Near 
East was formed by the missionaries. If American opinion has been uninformed, 
misinformed, and prejudiced, the missionaries are largely to blame.”24 By the 
outbreak of World War I, American prejudices against Arab Muslims and even Arab 
Christians had already become widespread due to missionary activity at the end of 
the nineteenth century. In the 1890s, missionary reports on the “Armenian troubles” 
exaggerated the number of casualties and the level of material destruction. Muslim 
deaths were never reported, reinforcing the image of the “ignorant, ruthless, 
unspeakable, and terrible Turks.”25 Public outrage over the oppression of Armenian 
Christians and other minorities, including Jews, led to the portrayal of Turks as 
brutal agents of persecution and produced a more generalized antipathy toward 
Islam and Muslims.26
Missionaries also provided unprecedented humanitarian relief to the Christian 
population of the Ottoman Empire during World War I.27 Humanitarian assistance, 
however, was not neutral, and Enver Pasha considered them as adversaries who 
were trying to divide the population of the empire.28 The war also brought on new 
understandings of humanitarianism. Keith David Watenpaugh argues that nineteenth-
century humanitarianism sought to alleviate the suffering of others in obedience to 
moral and religious duty, often – as with U.S. Protestants – in hopes of converting the 
recipients of aid.29 The humanitarianism ushered in by World War I, on the other hand, 
was envisioned as a permanent, institutional, neutral, and secular institution created to 
address and understand the roots of human suffering.30 Glazebrook’s consular career 
spanned these two periods and we can see in his approach a blend of these two kinds 
of humanitarianism, making his career as a humanitarian actor particularly valuable 
as a window into this transition.
Jerusalem Quarterly 84  [ 109 ]
Otis Glazebrook’s Biography
Otis Allan Glazebrook was born on 13 October 1845 in Richmond, Virginia, to Larkin 
Glazebrook, a prominent social and financial leader, and America Henley Bullington.31 
At fifteen, Glazebrook entered Randolph Macon College while preparing to become 
a cadet at West Point. With the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War in 1861, he secured 
an appointment as a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute, during which time he 
served as a corporal in the Confederate army and fought in the Battle of New Market 
in 1864. Demoralized and troubled by his war experiences, he established a youth 
organization at the end of the hostilities, the Alpha Tau Omega fraternity, aiming to 
reunite the North and South in brotherhood. After Glazebrook graduated from VMI in 
June 1865, he decided to go into the legal profession. The following year, he married 
Virginia Calvert Key Smith, and in 1867, their first son was born. Shortly afterward, 
Glazebrook entered the ministry in the Episcopal Church, and they left for Alexandria, 
Virginia, where he studied at the Virginia Episcopal Seminary. 
As a pastor, he served first in Virginia, then Baltimore, and later New Jersey. In 
1885, Glazebrook was appointed rector of St. John’s Protestant Episcopal Church in 
Elizabeth, New Jersey, and also served as chaplain of the 3rd New Jersey Regiment. 
At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, he was recalled into army 
service, though it is not clear whether he saw military action.32 As a Freemason, 
Glazebrook also served as the chaplain of the Grand Lodge of Masons of New Jersey 
and similar organizations, eventually receiving the Order of the Holy Sepulchre. In his 
exceptional, diverse career, Glazebrook remained the leader of the Alpha Tau Omega 
fraternity, which continued its expansion nationwide, until his appointment as U.S. 
consul in Jerusalem in 1914. 
In 1906, his wife Virginia died and although his personal attachment to his land and 
work changed, he kept serving as the rector of St. John’s in Elizabeth until 1912. Upon 
retirement in 1914, Glazebrook was selected for diplomatic service by his friend, U.S. 
president Woodrow Wilson. The scant sources available suggests that their friendship 
developed through church and academic activities in New Jersey. Wilson became the 
president of Princeton University in 1902, and also belonged to the Phi Kappa Psi 
fraternity, which espoused values of humanitarianism and brotherhood in common 
with Alpha Tau Omega.33 Glazebrook supported Wilson’s candidacy for governor of 
New Jersey in 1910 and then president in 1912. In February 1914, Truman appointed 
Glazebrook, then sixty-nine years old, as U.S. consul to Jerusalem; by April, he was 
in Jerusalem.34 The new job was a dream come true for the former pastor. Glazebrook 
saw it as a partial retirement from parochial service that would allow him to indulge 
in biblical studies while protecting U.S. interests.35 He even remarried in Jerusalem, 
wedding Emmaline Rumford, an American. 
The quiet life Glazebrook had envisioned was soon complicated by the outbreak 
of war in Europe and Ottoman entry on the side of the Central Powers. In Jerusalem, 
Glazebrook was responsible for caring for the small American community in 
Palestine, but as time went on he extended his protection over citizens of other 
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countries (Palestinian Muslims did not represent a major concern for Glazebrook) and 
played a major role in aiding various religious communities in the city, particularly the 
Jewish community.36 In May 1917, with the United States’ entry into World War I and 
the rupture of diplomatic relations between the U.S. government and the Ottomans, 
Glazebrook left Palestine. After a relatively short period back in the United States, 
Glazebrook returned to Jerusalem in December 1918, where he remained for two 
more years. 
Figure 1. U.S. consul Otis A. Glazebrook (center, wearing top hat) in Jerusalem with his staff. Virginia 
Military Institute Archives, Photographic Collection 0003693, online at (digitalcollections.vmi.edu) bit.
ly/2GWGXWG (accessed 27 September 2020).
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At the end of 1920, at the age of seventy-five, Glazebrook accepted a new diplomatic 
appointment in Nice, France, where he served as U.S. consul until 1929, guarding the 
interests of American tourists and businessmen travelling throughout southern France. 
In 1930, Emmaline died and Glazebrook’s health began to deteriorate, and his son 
Otis Glazebrook, Jr., decided he should return to the United States. Glazebrook fell 
gravely ill on the return voyage, and died at sea on 26 April 1931, a few hours before 
reaching New York.37
Consular Activity during the War
U.S. consuls wrote annual and special reports on local government issues, the 
population, and the economy, and thus, from his appointment as consul in 1914 until 
he left in 1917, Glazebrook reported with great detail on the events taking place 
in Palestine. These included political developments, the effects of the war, and the 
socioeconomic crisis that afflicted the different communities living in Jerusalem. 
Glazebrook was also in the position of managing multiple relationships: with other 
foreign communities and governments in Palestine, with the U.S. government in 
Istanbul and Washington, with the Ottoman government, with the U.S. business 
community, and with the various efforts to provide humanitarian aid and relief to 
Jerusalem’s population.
With the outbreak of the war, Glazebrook was charged, as representative of a neutral 
party, with the protection of the interests and the property of England, France, Italy, 
Russia, Belgium, and Switzerland. Glazebrook noted: “Not only are their archives 
in my possession, but their consulates, cathedrals, institutional home and hospitals. 
Complications are constantly arising in the responsibility of their subjects still in and 
near Jerusalem.”38 In an August 1915 report to the State Department, Glazebrook 
clarified the magnitude of his mission: 
My duties have not only involved diplomacy, judicature, philanthropy, 
and great personal risks, but also that for which I have thought I was the 
least qualified, the management of finance and practical banking. . . . At 
times I have had the responsibility of more gold in cash than all the banks 
in this section put together.39 
Given the particular sensitivity, and added responsibility, of Glazebrook’s position, 
it is unsurprising that he coordinated closely with other U.S. officials. In particular, 
Glazebrook kept U.S. ambassador to Constantinople Henry Morgenthau, Sr., actively 
informed of developments in Palestine. The U.S. consul consistently sent detailed 
reports to his superior in Constantinople on a variety of subjects, despite Ottoman 
censorship.40 Glazebrook and Morgenthau both closely monitored the evolving 
conditions of Jews in the Ottoman Empire and in Palestine specifically. They pressured 
Ottoman authorities, reminding them that many Jews were Ottoman citizens. In early 
1915, Morgenthau wrote to remind Glazebrook of his friendship with Cemal Pasha 
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and instructed the consul to keep pressuring the Ottoman general to protect the Jewish 
community in Palestine.41 Relations with local Ottoman authorities were complex but 
mutually respectful. Zeki Bey, then the military commander of Jerusalem, described 
Glazebrook as “not only a consul of man’s appointment, but of God’s, a perfect 
gentleman and the ideal diplomat,”42 while Glazebrook gushed that he had “received 
much kindness here at the hands of the people in general and the officials in particular 
with whom I have managed to establish influential and close relations.”43
Throughout the war, Glazebrook also sought to maintain his normal consular role, 
dealing with U.S. citizens outside and within Palestine. U.S. companies requested 
information about business opportunities in the region, and Glazebrook’s responses 
are revealing of the circumstances of Jerusalem in the final days of Ottoman rule. In 
September 1916, the American Film Company, considering expanding its distribution 
in Palestine, asked Glazebrook about the number of cinemas, the types of pictures 
typically shown, public reception of these films, ticket prices, and the duties paid to 
the local administration.44 Thus, for example, we know that there was one cinema in 
the city, managed by Samuel Feige. It was open only on Saturdays; showed mainly 
short films from Germany and the occasional American film; and the average audience 
was three hundred people, with three different classes of tickets sold.45 As mentioned 
above, U.S. trade with Palestine had been minimal, and it remained difficult during the 
war. Glazebrook attributed this to “the long credits granted by European competitors 
and the great distance that separates [the U.S. from Palestine], as well as the lack 
of direct steamship connection that has been the greatest drawback.”46 In the same 
letter, though, Glazebrook looked optimistically to the future and pushed American 
businesses to engage further in Palestinian trade.
 Economic opportunity is less evident in Glazebrook’s reports than economic 
crisis, however. On 17 November 1914, Glazebrook reported on a discouraging trend: 
the increasing cost of living in Jerusalem.47 The following year’s report was more 
dramatic as prices continued to rise, not only due to the war but also to the infamous 
locust invasion in the summer 1915 “which ravaged everything that was green.”48 The 
population of Jerusalem, in particular, was relatively precarious even before the war, 
as it included a relatively large number of individuals – including elderly residents 
who came to live out their remaining days in the Holy Land – who were dependent 
on charity. The U.S. consular report for 1913, for example, described “the strange 
spectacle” of the city’s population growing despite the fact that Jerusalem had no 
“developed commerce nor an industry worthy of the name to attract its immigrants 
. . . with the result that the population without work exists principally on charity, 
which is sent from all parts of the world.”49 The wartime conditions exacerbated the 
vulnerability of this population.
Glazebook reported on the charitable services provided by foreigners, including 
Americans, to the local population, including the Jewish community. Glazebrook 
described, for example, the activities of Nathan Straus, an American Jew who operated 
a soup kitchen, a workroom, and a health bureau in Jerusalem, mainly serving the local 
Jewish community.50 But under the wartime conditions, those in need increasingly 
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turned to official actors as well. In an informal report, Glazebrook noted that the 
“consulate is besieged from early morning to late at night for all varieties of requests. 
The staff is kept constantly active.”51 Indeed, the U.S. consulate became a hub for 
distributing services to U.S. citizens and others. Glazebrook took evident pride in 
this role, writing, “American relief is wonderful in its assistance to the destitute of 
the Holy Land.”52 At this point, the primary motivation for U.S. aid was humanitarian 
rather than political. Nonetheless, a link between religion, philanthropy, and power 
was forged – one that would have lasting influence.53 In a report of 1915 on the 
situation of Jerusalem during the war and with a particular focus on the Jews in the 
city, Glazebrook stated: “It is the unquestioned belief of the entire community that 
the Food Relief accomplished an unprecedented good, materially and morally, not 
only relieving extreme bodily want, but creating a feeling of good will and fellowship 
manifested in a spirit of friendly reciprocity never before existing in this city and 
consular district.”54
Glazebrook was directly involved in the distribution of food and aid to the religious 
communities of Palestine. At the start of 1915, Glazebrook, along with Captain Benton 
C. Decker of the USS Tennessee, petitioned Ambassador Morgenthau to ship food and 
aid from the United States to the Jewish community in Palestine and Jewish refugees 
in Alexandria, Egypt. This request was met, and in May 1915, the USS Vulcan 
eventually unloaded its food cargo in Palestine and distribution began to both Jewish 
and non-Jewish communities.55 Each community had its own distribution committee; 
Glazebrook sat on the Jewish community’s Va’ad ha-Makolet (Food Committee) 
and received information on the other committees in Jerusalem.56 In their excellent 
discussions of the wartime distribution of food and aid, Abigail Jacobson and Caitlin 
Carenen document the extent of Glazebrook’s involvement in the distribution of aid 
to the Jews of Palestine, as well as his role as mediator among the various Jewish 
communities.57 Effectively Glazebrook came to use a form of soft power or “welfare 
politics” dictated by his personal interest in the Jews, the support he received from 
his superiors – in particular Henry Morgenthau U.S. Ambassador in Constantinople, 
and his deep Christian faith. Despite this role, the question of Glazebrook’s views of 
Palestine’s Jews, and especially of Zionism, remain a matter of some contest.
Glazebrook and Zionism
In the past decade, a number of Israeli bloggers have expressed a new interest in Otis 
Glazebrook. For the most part, they have focused their attention on a photograph 
taken by the American Colony photography department, now part of the Matson 
Collection at the U.S. Library of Congress, which allegedly shows Glazebrook 
actively participating in an anti-Zionist demonstration.58 It is hard, if not impossible, 
to identify the consul among the crowd in the image, but the caption suggests he was 
being lifted up on the shoulders of Arab demonstrators. Some recent commentators 
also seem ready to echo Manuel’s claim that Glazebrook was an anti-Zionist who 
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feared Zionism’s potential to provoke conflict between Zionists and Arabs, as well as 
the spread of Bolshevism in Palestine by Russian Jews. Yet no evidence is brought 
forward by any of these authors.
Figure 2. “Anti-Zionist demonstration before the U.S. consulate, carrying Dr. Glazebrook on their 
shoulders, 27 February 1920.” Library of Congress LC-DIG-ppmsca-13291-00128 (digital file from 
original, page 44, no. 128), online at (loc.gov) bit.ly/3iQjX93 (accessed 27 September 2020).
Yet identifying Glazebrook as “anti-Zionist” obscures more than it illuminates. 
Instead, it might be argued that Glazebrook supported a type of Zionism that centered 
around religious and humanitarian attempts to alleviate the suffering of Jews.59 In a 
1915 report, Glazebrook drew no distinction between Zionists and the other Jews 
in Palestine and stated that the destruction of the Zionist movement would deal a 
major blow to the religious aspirations of Jews throughout the world. Paradoxically, 
this position convinced secular labor Zionists that the consul was an anti-Zionist.60 
Glazebrook understood the Zionist movement as the interest in reviving the Hebrew 
language, and he attributed to this no political aspirations.61 Glazebrook saw Zionism as 
a humanitarian movement with no political goals, at least not while the war continued, 
and claimed that Zionists had done nothing to indicate either intent or expectation of 
establishing a Jewish government.62 Instead, he expressed to a Jewish audience his 
readiness “to do for you anything in my power” because of the universally admirable 
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qualities he saw in Jewish mutual support, which in his words represented “the 
common characteristic and common aspiration of the peoples of the earth, nowhere 
more conspicuously seen than among the Hebrews of the Holy City: brotherhood and 
love of men.”63 Political Zionism – in the form of supporting the establishment of a 
Jewish entity in Palestine based on the work of pioneers – was not in keeping with 
the goals of the Protestant diplomacy or missionary work that Glazebrook embraced.64 
Looking at the support provided to the Jews throughout the war, however, we can see 
how U.S. involvement in Palestine grew due to the influence of the Jewish American 
and European Zionist organizations.65
Prior to the outbreak of World War I, the attitude of the U.S. State Department 
was unfriendly to Zionism and the increasing Jewish population in Palestine.66 Yet 
the general U.S. view of Palestine was undergoing a shift in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. Scholars of America–Holy Land studies have suggested 
that Americans in this period began to see the Holy Land through the prism of their 
own history, in which Zion was understood to be the land of their “fathers.”67 For 
Americans like Wilson and Glazebrook, the land of the Bible was a sort of idyllic 
alternative to the modern United States, an echo of preindustrial America.68 American 
Christians in the Holy Land were expected to be lifted out of their ordinary lives. 
The affinity of American Jews for the Holy Land was also linked to their American 
environment: both were promised lands.69 With the appointment of Morgenthau as 
U.S. ambassador in Constantinople, U.S. interests and humanitarian interests in the 
Jews of Palestine converged.70 Morgenthau, Jewish but not a Zionist, nevertheless 
expressed concern for his coreligionists and saw the relief of Palestine’s Jews as an 
American responsibility.
Michael Oren has argued that the United States treated the suffering of Ottoman Jews 
the same as the suffering of Armenians, but there were notable differences: American 
Jews were able to support their coreligionists through the remittance of money; and 
Ottoman Jews had not been subjected to racial policies meant to annihilate an entire 
population, as in the case of the Armenians.71 In spring 1917, Cemal Pasha ordered 
the evacuation of Jaffa. Many thought this policy targeted Jaffa’s Jewish community, 
as German Jewish and Austrian Jewish residents were “invited” to leave, while 
other German and Austrian nationals were allowed to remain if they chose.72 About 
nine thousand Jewish residents were relocated: many left for nearby colonies and 
others moved to the Jewish colonies in upper Galilee. Claims that Palestine’s Jewish 
community stood on the verge of annihilation, however, reached Europe and, more 
importantly, the United States, receiving little scrutiny because of their accordance 
with prevailing negative views of the Ottomans. The incident received diplomatic 
attention: the Spanish consul, the Conde de Ballobar, investigated the matter and 
the British invited Glazebrook to write a report.73 Before leaving Jerusalem in May 
1917, after diplomatic ties between the Ottoman Empire and the United States were 
severed, Glazebrook stated that “acts of violence said to have been committed against 
the Jewish population of Jaffa are grossly exaggerated.”74 All sources available note 
that Glazebrook petitioned Ottoman authorities to protect the Jews in Palestine. His 
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personal friendship with Cemal Pasha, which had served Glazebrook so well in the 
past, seems to have helped in this case, too.
During the war, American Zionism existed in two main factions: those like U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis who argued for more direct intervention 
with explicitly political goals in mind, and others like Morgenthau who wanted to 
avoid political commitments. Wilson’s election allowed Brandeis to urge the U.S. 
government to take a more active role in support of political Zionism, tipping the 
balance in its favor. Wilson’s support of the Balfour Declaration gave Zionists 
powerful leverage to influence American Jews and convert to political Zionism those 
who did not yet support the movement.75 Glazebrook and missionaries in general 
supported the principle of self-determination, but not ethnic nationalism. Political 
Zionism was perceived as a potentially separatist nationalism that was both secular and 
incompatible with Christian objectives in the region, making it a threat to interethnic 
and interreligious coexistence.76 This ideological shift within American Zionism had 
a significant impact on the U.S. role in Palestine. In a January 1925 interview with an 
American newspaper, Glazebrook spoke highly of the newly appointed British high 
commissioner in Palestine, Herbert Samuel, but refused to discuss Zionism.77 This 
refusal should not be read as antipathy for Zionism, but as evidence of the emerging 
distance between the Jews with and for whom Glazebrook endeavored in Palestine, 
and the Zionists who were, by the war’s end, imbued with political aspirations 
expressed in and emboldened by the Balfour Declaration.
Glazebrook represented those who, motivated by personal religious beliefs, 
considered it their duty to help Jews in recognition of a conviction that the Jews 
were part of a divine plan to redeem humanity. Scholars’ and bloggers’ description 
of Glazebrook’s politics as anti-Zionist indicates a misreading of the latter’s position 
but also a reduction of Zionism to its purely political dimension, effectively eliding 
its cultural and humanitarian variants. Glazebrook’s postwar reports show that he 
was concerned with the new brand of political Zionism introduced in Palestine, and 
openly supported by the U.S. government. A growing awareness and concern with the 
emerging Arab-Zionist conflict, though, clearly does not equate to anti-Zionism.
Conclusion
As Keith David Watenpaugh has argued, charitable actors in the early twentieth 
century practiced two predominant forms of humanitarianism.78 The first urged 
support of the needy by appealing to a sense of ethical and religious duty. The second 
came to have a symbiotic relationship with colonialism. Abigail Jacobson reached 
similar conclusions specific to Palestine, arguing that the politics of welfare linked 
humanitarianism and political power, creating a lasting legacy still visible in Israel 
today.79 As U.S. consul in Jerusalem during a crucial period – of local upheaval, 
regional transition, and global transformation – Otis Glazebrook played an important 
role in the transition from welfare humanitarianism to the institutional use of welfare 
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